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<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="http://msmvps.com/utility/FeedStylesheets/rss.xsl" media="screen"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/" xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"><channel><title>Search results for 'app:weblogs' matching tags 'Windows Server 2008 R2' and 'Security'</title><link>http://msmvps.com/search/SearchResults.aspx?q=app:weblogs&amp;tag=Windows+Server+2008+R2,Security&amp;orTags=0&amp;o=DateDescending</link><description>Search results for 'app:weblogs' matching tags 'Windows Server 2008 R2' and 'Security'</description><dc:language>en-US</dc:language><generator>CommunityServer 2008.5 SP2 (Build: 40407.4157)</generator><item><title>Microsoft Windows Unauthorized Digital Certificates</title><link>http://msmvps.com/blogs/ivansanders/archive/2012/06/07/microsoft-windows-unauthorized-digital-certificates.aspx</link><pubDate>Thu, 07 Jun 2012 05:00:00 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">d67277c4-116b-43f1-b688-e9ef184ea916:1810705</guid><dc:creator>ivansanders</dc:creator><description>&lt;p&gt;Original release date: June 04, 2012 &lt;font color="#ff0000"&gt;Source: US-CERT Alert TA12-156A&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Systems Affected&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;ul&gt;   &lt;li&gt;All supported versions of Microsoft Windows, including:&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;* Windows XP and Server 2003&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;* Windows Vista and Server 2008&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;* Windows 7 and Server 2008 R2&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;* Windows 8 Consumer Preview&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;* Windows Mobile and Phone&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Overview&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;X.509 digital certificates issued by the Microsoft Terminal Services licensing certificate authority (CA) can be illegitimately used to sign code. This problem was discovered in the Flame malware. Microsoft has released updates to revoke trust in the affected certificates.&lt;/li&gt; &lt;/ul&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Description&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;ul&gt;   &lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2012/06/03/microsoft-releases-security-advisory-2718704.aspx" target="_blank"&gt;Microsoft Security Advisory (2718704)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt; warns of active attacks using illegitimate certificates issued by the the &lt;strong&gt;Microsoft Terminal Services licensing certificate authority (CA&lt;/strong&gt;). There appear to be problems with some combination of weak cryptography and certificate usage configuration. From an MSRC blog post: &lt;/li&gt; &lt;/ul&gt;  &lt;p&gt;We identified that an &lt;strong&gt;older cryptography algorithm&lt;/strong&gt; could be exploited and then be used to sign code as if it originated from Microsoft. Specifically, our &lt;strong&gt;Terminal Server Licensing Service&lt;/strong&gt;, which allowed customers to authorize Remote Desktop services in their enterprise, used that older algorithm and provided certificates with the ability to sign code, thus permitting code to be signed as if it came from Microsoft. &lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2012/06/04/security-advisory-2718704-update-to-phased-mitigation-strategy.aspx"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Security Advisory 2718704: Update to Phased Mitigation Strategy&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt; What we found is that certificates issued by our &lt;strong&gt;Terminal Services licensing certification authority&lt;/strong&gt;, which are intended to only be used for license server verification, could also be used to &lt;strong&gt;sign code as Microsoft&lt;/strong&gt;. Specifically, when an enterprise customer requests a Terminal Services activation license, the certificate issued by Microsoft in response to the request allows code signing without accessing Microsoft&amp;#39;s internal PKI infrastructure.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;The following details about the affected certificates were provided in &lt;strong&gt;Microsoft Security Advisory (2718704):&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Certificate: &lt;strong&gt;Microsoft Enforced Licensing Intermediate PCA&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;ul&gt;   &lt;li&gt;Issued by: Microsoft Root Authority&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;Thumbprint: 2a 83 e9 02 05 91 a5 5f c6 dd ad 3f b1 02 79 4c 52 b2 4e 70&lt;/li&gt; &lt;/ul&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Certificate: &lt;strong&gt;Microsoft Enforced Licensing Intermediate PCA&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;ul&gt;   &lt;li&gt;Issued by: Microsoft Root Authority&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;Thumbprint: 3a 85 00 44 d8 a1 95 cd 40 1a 68 0c 01 2c b0 a3 b5 f8 dc 08&lt;/li&gt; &lt;/ul&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Certificate: &lt;strong&gt;Microsoft Enforced Licensing Registration Authority CA (SHA1)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;ul&gt;   &lt;li&gt;Issued by: Microsoft Root Certificate Authority&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;Thumbprint: fa 66 60 a9 4a b4 5f 6a 88 c0 d7 87 4d 89 a8 63 d7 4d ee 97&lt;/li&gt; &lt;/ul&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Impact&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;ul&gt;   &lt;li&gt;An attacker could obtain a certificate that could be used to illegitimately sign code as Microsoft. The signed code could then be used in a variety of attacks in which the code would appear to be trusted by Windows. An attacker could offer software that appeared to be signed by a valid and trusted Microsoft certificate chain. As noted in an MSRC blog post, &amp;quot;...some components of the [Flame] malware have been signed by certificates that allow software to appear as if it was produced by Microsoft.&amp;quot;&lt;/li&gt; &lt;/ul&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Solution&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;ul&gt;   &lt;li&gt;It is important to act quickly to revoke trust in the affected certificates. Any certificates issued by the Microsoft Terminal Services licensing certificate authority (CA) could be used for illegitimate purposes and should not be trusted.&lt;/li&gt; &lt;/ul&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Apply updates&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;ul&gt;   &lt;li&gt;Apply the appropriate versions of KB2718704 to add the affected certificates to the Untrusted Certificate Store. Updates will reach most users via automatic updates and Windows Server Update Services (WSUS).&lt;/li&gt; &lt;/ul&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Revoke trust in affected certificates Manually add the affected certificates to the Untrusted Certificate Store. The Certificates MMC snap-in and Certutil command can be used on Windows systems.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;References&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;ul&gt;   &lt;li&gt;* US-CERT Current Activity: Unauthorized Microsoft Digital&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;Certificates - &lt;a href="https://www.us-cert.gov/current/#microsoft_unauthorized_digital_certificates"&gt;https://www.us-cert.gov/current/#microsoft_unauthorized_digital_certificates&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;* Microsoft Security Advisory (2718704) - &lt;a href="https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/advisory/2718704"&gt;https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/advisory/2718704&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;* Unauthorized digital certificates could allow spoofing - &lt;a href="http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2718704"&gt;http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2718704&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;* Microsoft certification authority signing certificates added to the Untrusted Certificate Store - &lt;a href="https://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2012/06/03/microsoft-certification-authority-signing-certificates-added-to-the-untrusted-certificate-store.aspx"&gt;https://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2012/06/03/microsoft-certification-authority-signing-certificates-added-to-the-untrusted-certificate-store.aspx&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;* Microsoft releases Security Advisory 2718704 - &lt;a href="https://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2012/06/03/microsoft-releases-security-advisory-2718704.aspx"&gt;https://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2012/06/03/microsoft-releases-security-advisory-2718704.aspx&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;* Windows Server Update Services - &lt;a href="http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/bb332157.aspx"&gt;http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/bb332157.aspx&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;* Certutil - &lt;a href="http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732443%28v=ws.10%29.aspx"&gt;http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732443%28v=ws.10%29.aspx&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;* How to: View Certificates with the MMC Snap-in - &lt;a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms788967.aspx"&gt;http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms788967.aspx&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;&lt;/li&gt;    &lt;li&gt;&lt;/li&gt; &lt;/ul&gt;  &lt;p&gt;-Ivan&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Fix for DCOM 10009 Errors in Exchange 2010 SP1</title><link>http://msmvps.com/blogs/expta/archive/2011/07/07/fix-for-dcom-10009-errors-in-exchange-2010-sp1.aspx</link><pubDate>Thu, 07 Jul 2011 05:00:00 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">d67277c4-116b-43f1-b688-e9ef184ea916:1795875</guid><dc:creator>Anonymous</dc:creator><description>You may notice DistributedCOM 10009 errors in the Windows Server 2008 R2 System Event Log whenever you run any of the following Exchange 2010 SP1 cmdlets:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Get-OWAVirtualDirectory&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Get-WebServicesDirectory&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Get-ActiveSyncVirtualDirectory&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;div class="separator" style="clear:both;text-align:center;"&gt;
&lt;a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-mVUab3RgrvE/ThZukC3I8JI/AAAAAAAAGUQ/Rm79eCrixtM/s1600/DCOM_10009.png" style="margin-left:1em;margin-right:1em;"&gt;&lt;img border="0" height="395" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-mVUab3RgrvE/ThZukC3I8JI/AAAAAAAAGUQ/Rm79eCrixtM/s640/DCOM_10009.png" width="640" alt="" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The DCOM 10009 error reads as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="font-family:&amp;#39;Courier New&amp;#39;, Courier, monospace;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="font-family:&amp;#39;Courier New&amp;#39;, Courier, monospace;"&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;
Log Name:&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; System&lt;br /&gt;
Source:&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; Microsoft-Windows-DistributedCOM&lt;br /&gt;
Date:&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; 7/1/2011 10:16:11 AM&lt;br /&gt;
Event ID:&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; 10009&lt;br /&gt;
Task Category: None&lt;br /&gt;
Level:&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; Error&lt;br /&gt;
Keywords:&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; Classic&lt;br /&gt;
User:&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; N/A&lt;br /&gt;
Computer:&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; &lt;em&gt;CAS01.domain.com&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Description:&lt;br /&gt;
DCOM was unable to communicate with the computer &lt;em&gt;CAS02.domain.com&lt;/em&gt; using any of the configured protocols.&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;This happens because of an&amp;nbsp;security context error when invoking an RPC call to the remote CAS&amp;nbsp;server.&amp;nbsp; The fix is to direct the RPC Runtime to ignore delegation failures.&amp;nbsp; This can be done by configuring the registry on both the source and target machines, but is more easily done using Group Policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To configure Ignore Delegation Failures manually:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Run REGEDIT on the source computer&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Navigate to &lt;strong&gt;HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Rpc&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Create a new DWORD value called &lt;strong&gt;IgnoreDelegationFailure&lt;/strong&gt; with the value of &lt;strong&gt;1&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Restart the computer&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Repeat for each Exchange 2010 SP1 Client Access Server&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&amp;nbsp;To configure this setting using Group Policy:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Open the &lt;strong&gt;Group Policy Management Console&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Edit the Group Policy Object (GPO) that applies to the Exchange 2010 SP1 servers.&amp;nbsp; I usually use the Default Domain Policy.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Navigate to &lt;strong&gt;Computer Configuration&lt;/strong&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;strong&gt;Policies&lt;/strong&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;strong&gt;Administrative Templates&lt;/strong&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;strong&gt;System&lt;/strong&gt; &amp;gt; Remote &lt;strong&gt;Procedure Call&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Double-click &lt;strong&gt;Ignore Delegation Failure&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Enable&lt;/strong&gt; the policy and set the &lt;strong&gt;Ignoring Delegation Failure&lt;/strong&gt; setting to &lt;strong&gt;ON&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Restart the Exchange 2010 SP1 Client Access Servers&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
This DCOM 10009 error does not seem to affect Windows Server 2008 servers, only Windows Server 2008 R2.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;Did you find this information useful? Post a comment and share it with others!&lt;img width="1" height="1" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/798194812750898417-3982418176751813150?l=www.expta.com" alt="" /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>