September 2008 - Posts

Information about the other "scareware" lawsuits...

Here we go... the other lucky recipients of Microsoft's attentions in the "John Doe" (which I earlier called "Jane Doe") lawsuits are:

XPdefender.com
Case No. 08-2-33382-5 SEA
Judge Suzanne Barnett

WinSpywareProtect
Case No. 08-2-33380-9 SEA
Judge Joan DeBuque

WinDefender
Case No. 08-2-33377-9 SEA
Judge Michael J. Fox

MalwareCore
Case No. 08-2-33375-2 SEA
Judge Douglas McBroom

Antivirus 2009
Case No. 08-2-33372-8 SEA
Judge Bruce Heller

Microsoft also amended two pre-existing complaints to name the parties behind SMP Soft LLC, a Delaware corporation that markets a scareware product called Scan & Repair Utilities.

According to my notes from the Press Conference, the potential end result of these lawsuits could be up to $2,000.00 per violation, plus attorney fees and restitution.

XPdefender.com
IP previously 74.52.55.179 (ThePlanet)
Registrar: Directi Internet Solutions Pvt. Ltd (WHOIS notes the registration service was provided by VIVIDS MEDIA GMBH)
Created: 3 October 2007
Previously shared IP address with Allforipod.net, Antispamsoft.net, Antispamsoft1.biz, Antispamsoft2.biz, Antispamsoft3.biz, Apple2iphone.net, Audio-convertors.com, Audio-editors.net, Backup-recovery.net, Bucksoft.info, Cddvdtools.com, Digitalphototools.net, Filemanagementtool.com, Filmsglobal.net, Fuckyourvirus.com, Go2cinema.net, Graphiceditors.net, Hatepopup.com, Hunt100.info, Imageconvertors.com, Iphone4ik.net, Iphonedreams.net, Justamovie.net, Keylogger007.com, Moviesworldonline.net, Playipod.net, Radio-tools.net, Screensaverino.com, Search100world.info, Sys-def-stat.com, Thefunsearch.info, Timeandclock.net, Upmovies.net, Virtualdvdsoft.com and yoursecuritysoft.com

WinSpywareProtect (winspywareprotect.com?)
IP: 216.195.50.66 (APS Telecom)
Registrar: Godaddy.com, Inc
WHOIS hidden behind Domains By Proxy, Inc
Created 11 March 2008
Shares IP address with winspywareprotects.com

WinDefender (windefender.com?)
IP: 58.65.234.193 (HostFresh)
Registrar: Tucows, Inc
WHOIS hidden behind Whois Anonymizer, Brazil
Created 9 January 2004
Shares IP address with antimalwaresuite2009.com, bestwindefence.com, championwindefence.com, cleaner2009pro.com, vixitsystems.com, win-defence.com, windefencesolution.com, windefencetool.com, windefenderpro2008.com and windefenders.com

MalwareCore (malwarecore.com?)
IP previously 85.255.120.20 (UkrTeleGroup)
Registrar: Estdomains, Inc
WHOIS - Registrant "Herman Pulser", who apparently owned about 74 other domains!
Created 25 January 2008
Previously shared IP address with psehole.org, fuckteencunt.com, magic-landing.com, microsoftpublic.com, mssetup.net, supereasygo.net, thefuckteen.com, forbposter.com, allmeddrugs.com, allmedicalpills.com, emeddrugs.com, justmeddrugs.com, medpillssite.com and medpillsworld.com (Quite a variety, yes?  The domain microsoftpublic.com deserves closer attention)

Antivirus 2009 (antivirus2009.com, .net, .org and .info have all been registered - .org and .info are "on hold", .net apparently does not have a web site - I don't know yet which site the lawsuit is against)

antivirus2009.net - Registrar Estdomains.
IP previously 69.50.160.212 (Intercage)

antivirus2009.info - Registrar Afilias Limited
IP previously 68.178.232.100 and 85.17.45.148 (GoDaddy and Leaseweb)

antivirus2009.com - Registrar 1&1 Internet
IP 74.208.128.155

antivirus2009.org - Registrar Estdomains
IP previously 69.50.160.212 (Intercage)

Announcement: Microsoft and the Washington Attorney General unveil several "scareware" lawsuits

Edited to update documentary links..

Washington Attorney General, Rob McKenna (whose work has been featured on this blog several times) and Richard Boscovich, Senior Attorney for Microsoft's Internet Safety Enforcement Team, unveiled several lawsuits against malware (what they call "scareware") pushers today.  The lawsuits are the first to be filed under the State's recently amended Computer Spyware Act.   Note that there have been earlier lawsuits, but they were *before* the Computer Sypware Act was amended.

The news conference was attended by Attorney General Rob McKenna, Richard Boscovich and Paula Selis, Senior Counsel at the Attorney General's Office, Consumer Protection Division.

I am listening to the Press Conference as I type, so I apologize if this entry is a bit disjointed.  The Press Release includes a visual demonstration of scareware, which will give me a chance to catch up on typing this article while the reporters watch a video demonstrating what we are so familiar with.

I do have one complaint though - is it really so hard for the apparently professional reporters to use the god-damned mute button on their telephones so that we don't have to listen to their hands squelching on their phone handsets, papers rustling or their sighs/heavy breathing except for during question?????????  Yes, I used my mute button.

The official Press Release says:

SEATTLE – Attorney General Rob McKenna stood at the frontlines with Microsoft Corp. in the war against spyware in 2006. Now armed with tougher legislation, the state’s top law enforcement officer, with the world’s largest software company, is charging forward with new lawsuits targeting scareware purveyors.

The Attorney General’s Office along with Microsoft has yanked the fear factor dial out of the hands of businesses that use scareware as a marketing tool and have spun it toward them,” McKenna said.

We won’t tolerate the use of alarmist warnings or deceptive ‘free scans’ to trick consumers into buying software to fix a problem that doesn’t even exist,” McKenna continued. “We’ve repeatedly proven that Internet companies that prey on consumers’ anxieties are within our reach.”

The Attorney General’s Office along with Microsoft announced the filing of new cases under Washington’s recently improved Computer Spyware Act during a joint press conference today in Seattle.

Microsoft is honored to assist Washington Attorney General McKenna in helping to protect consumers from online threats,” said Richard Boscovich, Senior Attorney for Microsoft's Internet Safety Enforcement Team. “Cybercrime continues to evolve, but with public/private collaboration such as this, we can work to champion tougher laws, greater public awareness and, ultimately, stronger protections for online consumers.

In 2005, Washington became one of the first states to adopt a law explicitly prohibiting spyware activities and imposing serious penalties on violators. The statute doesn’t stop at outlawing programs that collect personal information, but uses a broader definition of “spyware” and punishes those who mislead users into believing software is necessary for security. The law was updated last session to create additional liability for third-parties that permit the transmission of spyware and to address new types of deceptive behaviors, such as misrepresenting the need for computer repairs.

As of today, the Attorney General’s Office has filed seven suits under the statute.

The Attorney General’s Office filed its latest case today in King County Superior Court against the marketers of a program called Registry Cleaner XP. The civil suit brings five causes of action against James Reed McCreary IV, of The Woodlands, Texas, and two businesses: Branch Software, of The Woodlands, Texas, doing business as Registry Cleaner XP, and Alpha Red, Inc., of Houston, Texas. McCreary is the sole director of Branch Software and CEO of Alpha Red.

McKenna said Microsoft referred the case to the Attorney General’s Consumer Protection High-Tech Unit and has been helpful in assisting the office with enforcement issues.

According to the state’s complaint, the defendants sent incessant pop-ups resembling system warnings to consumers’ personal computers. The messages read “CRITICAL ERROR MESSAGE! – REGISTRY DAMAGED AND CORRUPTED,” and instructed users to visit a Web site to download Registry Cleaner XP.

Computers capable of receiving Windows Messenger Service pop-ups, also known as Net Send messages, were vulnerable to the attacks. Windows Messenger Service, not to be confused with the instant-messaging program Windows Live Messenger, is primarily designed for use on a network and allows administrators to send notices to users.

Consumers who visited the Web site were offered a free scan to check their computer – but the program found ‘critical’ errors every time,” said Senior Counsel Paula Selis, who leads the Attorney General’s Consumer Protection High-Tech Unit. “Users were then told to pay $39.95 to repair these dubious problems.”

The filings today bring the number of civil spyware actions brought by Microsoft since the Computer Spyware Act was first enacted in 2005 to 17.  In 2006, Microsoft and the Attorney General each brought lawsuits against the same group of defendants under the Washington Computer Spyware Act, obtaining permanent injunctions and settlements.   Additionally, Microsoft has routinely worked with the FTC and other state and federal law enforcement agencies in the battle against spyware.

Spyware has arguably become the biggest online threat to consumers and businesses since the advent of the Internet. Microsoft has said that 50 percent of its customer-support calls related to computer crashes can be blamed on spyware.

Complaint:
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/News/Press_Releases/2008/ComplaintRegistryCleaner.pdf

Registry Cleaner XP demo:
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/News/Press_Releases/2008/RegistryCleanerXP-Demo.wmv"

The Attorney General said that the thing that bothered him most was the "blatant rip-off" that is scareware.  It was also mentioned that 50% of support calls to Microsoft were related to scareware - yes, 50%.  So far, as I listen to the demonstration, I have heard no mention of the double-dipping on credit cards that scareware is so notorious for - regular readers will know that Bucksbill is notorious for charging $70 or so instead of $35 or so.

Hang on, Richard Boscovich of Microsoft is speaking now...

Ok, Richard says that of the 7 lawsuits mentioned, five are apparently "Jane Doe" type lawsuits, where some parties are not yet identified. 

The primary focus of the reporters, and Paula/Richard, was discussing *how* the scareware alerts get on to a user's system - the primary, nay the only, cause mentioned was Net Send (aka Windows Messenger, which should not be confused with Windows Live Messenger (the online chat software).  Windows Messenger Service is, of course, disabled by default as of XP SP2 and only works if there is no firewall interfering.  Disappointingly, no mention was made of malvertizing!

Details of the other lawsuits are not available at time of writing.  I am sure that information will eventually appear on microsoft.com but for now, all we have is the PDF complaint mentioned in the Washington Attorney General's Press Release.

So, where are Esthosts/Estdomains now that Intercage/Atrivo are in such trouble?

Let's take a look-see at where Intercage/Atrivo's most infamous client, esthosts/estdomains, are situated - using Domaintools, cidr-report.org and bfk-de, and a smattering of Sam Spade 1.14.  I'm not using Robtex that much because I get the sense that, sometimes, its data is behind the times and it should be noted that by the time this article goes live, things may have changed again.  I think the hardest part of writing about this stuff is not doing the research per se, but rather, trying to distill the information down into a format that is half-way possible to understand.

In summary, what do we see?  Well, it looks like Esthosts/Estdomains have come to rest in Russia and Amsterdam.  I also note that their infamous ex-host Intercage (who are, apparently, still off the air) continue to have some involvement with Esthost/Estdomains via protectdetails.com (protectdetails.com is the WHOIS privacy service Estdomains created to replace Directi's PrivacyProtect service) and Cernel. I was also interested to note that Domaintools reports that the SSL Certificate for protectdetails.com and cernel.org are both "billing.esthost.com" (btw, note that the correct spelling is CERNEL, not CERNAL - even hostexploit.com got the spelling wrong in places in its PDF report...)

I don't expect things to settle down any time soon.  Those behind malware, and malware hosting, are being watched like a hawk.  For example, reports about Intercage who, as I noted on the 25th, being knocked offline again over the past 24 hours or so include:

UnitedLayer COO: Giving access to InterCage is an issue of ethics (an interview with Intercage/Atrivo's latest peer explaining why they were willing to take Intercage/Atrivo on)
Yes, Atrivo/Intercage is Offline Again...
Notorious ISP Intercage goes dark again (notes that "Kacperski is evaluating whether his company [Atrivo/Intercage] can continue as a business")
Net pariah Intercage back among the dead - No more Global Crossing 
Intercage, gone with the wind again

 

The nitty gritty details of Esthosts/Estdomains are...

estdomains.com  A   83.171.76.98 - ZAO Petersburg Transit Telecom (PTT), Russia (AS31353)  *A*
estdomains.com  A   94.102.49.3 - Ecatel LTD, Amsterdam (AS29073) *B*
estdomains.com  NS  ans1.esthost.com
estdomains.com  NS  ans2.esthost.com
estdomains.com  NS  temp1.estdomains.com
estdomains.com  NS  ns1.estdomains.com
estdomains.com  NS  temp2.estdomains.com
estdomains.com  NS  ns2.estdomains.com
estdomains.com  NS  a.estdomains.com
estdomains.com  NS  b.estdomains.com

esthost.com  A  94.102.49.3 - Ecatel LTD, Amsterdam (AS29073) *C*
esthost.com  NS  ens1.esthost.com
esthost.com  NS  ans2.esthost.com
esthost.com  NS  ans3.esthost.com
esthost.com  NS  ans4.esthost.com

 

*A*
83.171.76.98 A  ns2.protectdetails.com - ZAO Petersburg Transit Telecom (PTT), Russia (AS31353)
83.171.76.86 A  estdomains.com
83.171.76.86 A  b.estdomains.com

 

*B* and *C*
94.102.49.3 A  estdomains.com - Ecatel LTD, Amsterdam (AS29073)
94.102.49.3 A  esthost.com

 

protectdetails.com  A  89.108.73.87 - Agava JSC, Russia (AS39561)  *D*
protectdetails.com  NS  ns1.protectdetails.com
protectdetails.com  NS  ns2.protectdetails.com

ns2.protectdetails.com - A: 69.50.176.229 - Intercage Inc, California (note: SSL Cert billing.esthost.com) (AS27595) *E*
ns2.protectdetails.com - A: 83.171.76.98 - ZAO Petersburg Transit Telecom (PTT), Russia (AS31353)

 

*E*
69.50.176.229 also hosts cernel.org, online-company.com, otegra.com, otegra.net

69.50.176.229 A ns2.protectdetails.com
69.50.176.229 A ns1.esthost.com
69.50.176.229 A ens1.esthost.com
69.50.176.229 A ns2.esthost.com
69.50.176.229 A ns2.cernel.net

 

WHOIS

protectdetails.com
69.50.180.157 (Domaintools) - Intercage Inc, California (AS27295)
Registrar: Estdomains, Inc
Created 11 June 2008
Registrant: Protect Details Inc, Domain Manager, privatecontact@protectdetails.com

cernel.net
216.255.190.85 (Domaintools) - Intercage Inc, California (AS27295)
Registrar: Estdomains, Inc
Created 28 November 2005
Registrant Cernel Inc, Legal Department, support@cernel.net

cernel.org
69.50.176.229 (Domaintools) - Intercage Inc. California (AS27295)
Registrar: Estdomains, Inc
Created 28 November 2008
Registrant: Cernel Inc, Legal Department, support@cernel.net
Note: SSL Cert is noted as billing.esthost.com (Domaintools)

 

ZAO Petersburg Transit Telecom (PTT), Russia (AS31353)  *A*
Upstream ASN-SPBNIT OJSC North-West Telecom Autonomous System (AS8997)

ASN-SPBNIT OJSC North-West Telecom Autonomous System (AS8997)
Upstream ROSTELECOM-AS (AS12389), RTCOMM-AS (AS8342), TRANSTELECOM (AS20485), RETN-AS (AS9002)

 

Ecatel LTD, Amsterdam (AS29073)  *B* and *C*
Upstream OPEN-PEERING-AS (AS20562), OPENHOSTING (AS33970), TISCALI-BACKBONE (AS3257), HURRICANE (AS6939)

 

Agava JSC, Russia (AS39561)  *D*
Upstream - Skymedia, Russia (AS39134)

Skymedia, Russia (AS39134)
Upstream Transtelecom, Russia (AS20485)

Transtelecom, Russia (AS20485)
Upstream Tiscali-Backbone (AS3257), IS (AS3741), Rostelecom-AS (AS12389), Telianet (AS1299), CW Cable and Wireless (AS1273), NTT-Communications-2914 (AS2914), RETN-AS (AS9002), BTN-ASN (AS3491)

 

Intercage Inc, California (note: SSL Cert billing.esthost.com) (AS27595)  *E*
No upstream provider

Atrivo/Intercage: down but not yet out...

Don't we love the online press?   I've been watching the fall-out and online reports of Atrivo's short lived disappearance off the net, and I think this is one of the more ... misinformed ... articles that I have seen so far:

US-Based Malware Network Shuts Down Source: Dark Reading

The article says (my comments in bold):

"An Internet service provider (ISP) that was widely used by hackers and criminals for the exchange of data and malware is no longer operating, observers say."    They were only "no longer operating" insofar as they were without an upstream peer for a short period of time - they haven't actually gone out of business or anything like that...

"Yesterday, however, several observers reported that the Atrivo network is no longer operating. The service appears to have shut down, and attempts to contact its operators by email have received no reply, the observers say.Actually, Atrivo/Intercage representatives (Emil Kacperski and Russell Mitchell) were quite vocal on the Nanog mailing list after the de-peering...

""I'd be interested to find out why they shut down," said Robert Graham, CEO and founder of Errata Security, a security research firm. "They've actually been down for a while. My guess would be either a network failure or they've been raided by somebody [in law enforcement].I haven't heard about any raids, I haven't seen any reports of a network failure, and as far as I know, they weren't knocked completely offline until dropped by PIE (Pacific Internet Exchange) - that didn't happen until last Sunday.

"But whether it was shut down by other ISPs, law enforcement, or network failure, Atrivo's apparent demise probably won't have much long-term impact on the flow of malware or other exploits, Graham says. "I expect the people who were using Atrivo will just go elsewhere," he says. "It's like a gigantic game of whack-a-mole. You shut one down, and the [exploits] pop up elsewhere.Well, at least this "guesstimate" was more accurate - it seems Atrivo/Intercage may already be back online with a new upstream peer, Unitedlayer (AS23342)

Internet Explorer Security levels compared... courtesy of Steve Riley

I've wanted to do this for ages ... never did get around to it ... ;o)

Steve has put together a chart listing the default settings for each Internet Explorer security level (IE7 on Vista SP1) - you can find it here:
http://blogs.technet.com/steriley/archive/2008/09/16/internet-explorer-security-levels-compared.aspx

Posted by sandi with no comments
Filed under:

Atrivo/Intercage are offline, for now...

And they're not happy...

The question is, where will Atrivo/Intercage's infamous clientele go? 

The hostexploit.com study that was at the centre of this maelstrom can still be found at the URL below (a PDF, just under 2 megabytes in size):

http://hostexploit.com/downloads/Atrivo%20white%20paper%20090308ad.pdf

 

image

Adobe Flash and clipboard attacks - changes on the way

Adobe have blogged about changes being made to Flash to address various security issues, including the Flash clipboard attacks that received so much press attention not that long ago.

Blog article here:
http://blogs.adobe.com/psirt/2008/09/clipboard_attack_update.html

Devnet article:
http://www.adobe.com/devnet/flashplayer/articles/fplayer10_security_changes.html

 

The changes:

In Flash Player 9, ActionScript could perform uploads and downloads at any time. With Flash Player 10 beta, the FileReference.browse and FileReference.download operations may be initiated only through ActionScript that originates from user interaction. This includes actions such as clicking the mouse or pressing the keyboard.

In Flash Player 9, ActionScript could set data on the system Clipboard at any time. With Flash Player 10 beta, the System.setClipboard() method may be successfully called only through ActionScript that originates from user interaction. This includes actions such as clicking the mouse or using the keyboard. This user interaction requirement also applies to the new ActionScript 3.0 Clipboard.generalClipboard.setData() and Clipboard.generalClipboard.setDataHandler() methods.

New to Flash 10:  In Flash Player 9, the system Clipboard could not be read at any time. With Flash Player 10 beta, the new ActionScript 3.0 method Clipboard.generalClipboard.getData() may be used to read the contents of the system Clipboard, but only when it is called from within an event handler processing a flash.events.Event.PASTE event.

Tightening of cross-domain policies - meta-policy default changed from "all" to "master-only".

 

It will be very interesting to see how this affecting the world of malvertizing.

I sense a Nesco phish approaching....

Newly registered via Directi ... cid38.mobi

cid38.mobi is hosting a copy of a legitimate web site - note the URL in the address bar:

image

And here is the real site - again, note the site in the address bar:

 image

I sense a phishing storm approaching ...

imageI'm sure my readers already know about the goings-on affecting Estdomains/Intercage and Atrivo in recent times - suffice to say that the bad guys are being chased from pillar to post and back again, and were at risk of being knocked off the Internet completely.

Brian Krebs can claim credit for starting this most recent bloodbath.  His efforts, and more importantly the success he has achieved, makes my small efforts chasing individual fraudware domains from host to host absolutely pale in comparison :o)

Brian's reports can be seen here (about Atrivo):
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/08/report_slams_us_host_as_major.html

and here (again about Atrivo):
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/09/scam-heavy_us_isp_grows_more_i.html

and here (about Estdomains, described as Atrivo's biggest customer):
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/09/estdomains.html

and here (again about Estdomains):
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/09/estdomains_a_sordid_history_an.html

To summarize briefly, the end result of Brian's articles was that Intercage (aka Atrivo) lost its upstream providers, being dumped by "Global Crossing" (a name that will appear again later in this article) as well as BandCon and WVFiber.  Not only that, nLayer Communications have demanded that Atrivo hand back a slew of IP addresses supplied to them by nLayer. 

Atrivo/Intercage eventually came to rest at Pacific Internet Exchange LLC.  PIA's upstream is COGENT, who are apparently watching the situation very closely (COGENT ticket number HD0000000789038)  (source: NANOG mailing list)

Intercage declared on the 7th of September that they were removing Hostfresh from their network (Hostfresh being another name associated with Esthost/Estdomains). Hostfresh's upstream is currently ANC Asia Netcom Corporation, who have in turn spread their requirements between 15 different upstream providers, being Tiscali, Global Crossing, AT&T, TeliaNet, Flag Telecom, Reach Network, Hong Kong Internet Exchange, Singtel, Equinex, PIPE, Internet Initiative Japan, Hutchison, KDI, Korean Telecom and Telecom Italia.  With such a high level of redundancy, it may be harder to encourage ANCAsia Netcom to take action, should that be needed.

 

Estdomains have fought back, issuing a press release that you can see here:
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2008/09/prweb1325214.htm

and here:
http://www.domainnews.com/en/general/estdomains-denies-links-to-malware-distribution.html

Anyway, that is enough history - let's get back to the potential phishing storm.  Estdomain's indignation in their press release rings a little false when we look at some of their most recent registrations.  Check it out - I am sure you will agree there is a definite banking "flavor" - the registrations occurred within the past 24 hours or so:

bankdatacentral.us
bank-securities.us
databank1.us
digitaldata1.us
ebanking-solution.us
ebank-services.us
ebank-express.us
ebank-xpress.us
online-processor.us
securitydata-services.us
bankdata1.us
bankdataone.us
banking-global.us
center-security.us
ebanking-net.us
ebanking-network.us
ebanking-servers.us
ebanking-solutions.us
ebanking-system.us
internet-securebanking.us
it-securities.us
secure-server3.us
secure-solution.us
securitydata-server1.us
securitydata-server12.us
securitydata-server3.us
securityservice1.us

When I started writing this article, bankdatacentral.us was hosting a fake "First Bank" login page at bankdatacentral.us/olb/ (screenshot above), and was using a geolocator script from ip2location.com. This script recorded IP location, geographical location, latitude/longitude, IP in use, time zone, IDD code and "weather station".  For a short while, the URL bankdatacentral.us went offline (failing to resolve), before reappearing and again loading bankdatacentral.us/olb/ which in turn directed to bankdatacentral.us/s/c.php without showing any other content, but then the fake log-in page at /olb/ came back.

Content for /olb/ is being pulled directly from www2.firstbanks.com (style sheets, graphics, javascript).

I should also point out that in recent times I have also seen malware sites utilizing maxmind.com, which supplies similar "gelocation technology" to that supplied by ip2location.com.

Up until a few days ago, Estdomains were registering a lot of medical related domains, such as meds1499.us, meds1512.com, meds1513.com, meds1514.us, meds1515.com etc etc etc (you get the idea, I'm sure).  The domains that were live when I looked at them were hosting or redirecting to various "Canadian Pharmacy" sites.

In short, things are not over yet - not by a long shot.  In fact, I see that, within the last hour and a half, a new domain has been added to my list, online172.com (and online175, and online 176, and online 139, and online136 at different times), which at time of writing are redirecting to a "Canadian Pharmacy" site.

ALERT: malvertizements currently in circulation

There are several malvertizements in circulation - some of which are "new".  I have not seen malvertizements featuring Dish Network or Lumosity before today.

 

Cardstore.com - created using Fuse

image

 

Dish Network - created using Fuse

image

image

 

Fast free new car quotes - an older style malvertizement that was NOT created using Fuse

image

 

 

Lumosity "Reclaim Your Brain" games- created using Fuse

 

image   image

Update QuickTime please...

A new version has been released that addresses several security issues.

Quoting from the Apple security announcement:

"QuickTime
CVE-ID:  CVE-2008-3615
Available for:  Windows Vista, XP SP2 and SP3
Impact:  Viewing a maliciously crafted movie file may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description:  An uninitialized memory access issue exists in the third-party Indeo v5 codec for QuickTime, which does not ship with QuickTime. Viewing a maliciously crafted movie file may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution. This update addresses the issue by not rendering content encoded with any version of the Indeo codec. This issue does not affect systems running Mac OS X. Credit to Paul Byrne of NGSSoftware for reporting this issue.

QuickTime
CVE-ID:  CVE-2008-3635
Available for:  Windows Vista, XP SP2 and SP3
Impact:  Viewing a maliciously crafted movie file may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description:  A stack buffer overflow exists in the third-party Indeo
v3.2 codec for QuickTime. Viewing a maliciously crafted movie file may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution. This update addresses the issue by not rendering content encoded with any version of the Indeo codec. This issue does not affect systems running Mac OS X. Credit to an anonymous researcher working with TippingPoint's Zero Day Initiative for reporting this issue.

QuickTime
CVE-ID:  CVE-2008-3624
Available for:  Mac OS X v10.4.9 - v10.4.11, Mac OS X v10.5 or later, Windows Vista, XP SP2 and SP3
Impact:  Viewing a maliciously crafted QTVR movie file may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description:  A heap buffer overflow exists in QuickTime's handling of panorama atoms in QTVR (QuickTime Virtual Reality) movie files.
Viewing a maliciously crafted QTVR file may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution. This update addresses the issue through improved bounds checking of panorama atoms. Credit to Roee Hay of IBM Rational Application Security Research Group for reporting this issue.

QuickTime
CVE-ID:  CVE-2008-3625
Available for:  Mac OS X v10.4.9 - v10.4.11, Mac OS X v10.5 or later, Windows Vista, XP SP2 and SP3
Impact:  Viewing a maliciously crafted QTVR movie file may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description:  A stack buffer overflow exists in QuickTime's handling of panorama atoms in QTVR (QuickTime Virtual Reality) movie files.
Viewing a maliciously crafted QTVR file may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution. This update addresses the issue through improved bounds checking of panorama atoms. Credit to an anonymous researcher working with TippingPoint's Zero Day Initiative for reporting this issue.

QuickTime
CVE-ID:  CVE-2008-3614
Available for:  Windows Vista, XP SP2 and SP3
Impact:  Opening a maliciously crafted PICT image may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description:  An integer overflow exists in QuickTime's handling of PICT images. Opening a maliciously crafted PICT image may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution. This update addresses the issue by performing additional validation of PICT images. Credit to an anonymous researcher working with the iDefense VCP for reporting this issue.

QuickTime
CVE-ID:  CVE-2008-3626
Available for:  Mac OS X v10.4.9 - v10.4.11, Mac OS X v10.5 or later, Windows Vista, XP SP2 and SP3
Impact:  Viewing a maliciously crafted movie file may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description:  A memory corruption issue exists in QuickTime's handling of STSZ atoms in movie files. Viewing a maliciously crafted movie file may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution. This update addresses the issue through improved bounds checking of STSZ atoms. Credit to an anonymous researcher working with TippingPoint's Zero Day Initiative for reporting this issue.

QuickTime
CVE-ID:  CVE-2008-3627
Available for:  Mac OS X v10.4.9 - v10.4.11, Mac OS X v10.5 or later, Windows Vista, XP SP2 and SP3
Impact:  Viewing a maliciously crafted movie file may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description:  Multiple memory corruption exist in QuickTime's handling of H.264 encoded movie files. Viewing a maliciously crafted movie file may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution. This update addresses the issue by performing additional validation of H.264 encoded movie files. Credit to an anonymous researcher and Subreption LLC working with TippingPoint's Zero Day Initiative for reporting this issue.

QuickTime
CVE-ID:  CVE-2008-3628
Available for:  Windows Vista, XP SP2 and SP3
Impact:  Opening a maliciously crafted PICT image may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description:  An invalid pointer issue exists in QuickTime's handling of PICT images. Opening a maliciously crafted PICT image may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution.
This update addresses the issue by correctly saving and restoring a global variable. This issue does not affect systems running Mac OS X.
Credit to David Wharton for reporting this issue.

QuickTime
CVE-ID:  CVE-2008-3629
Available for:  Mac OS X v10.4.9 - v10.4.11, Mac OS X v10.5 or later, Windows Vista, XP SP2 and SP3
Impact:  Opening a maliciously crafted PICT image may lead to an unexpected application termination
Description:  An out-of-bounds read issue exists in QuickTime's handling of PICT images. Opening a maliciously crafted PICT image may lead to an unexpected application termination. This update addresses the issue by performing additional validation of PICT images. Credit to Sergio 'shadown' Alvarez of n.runs AG for reporting this issue.

QuickTime 7.5.5 may be obtained from the Software Update application, or from the QuickTime Downloads site:
http://www.apple.com/quicktime/download/

For Mac OS X v10.5 or later
The download file is named:  "QuickTime755_Leopard.dmg"
Its SHA-1 digest is:  934f784a553c2d4484d298071ad6d95ea34b8b2f

For Mac OS X v10.4.9 through Mac OS X v10.4.11 The download file is named:  "QuickTime755_Tiger.dmg"
Its SHA-1 digest is:  dcdf58e27aad2a1e958788c0f58584605c4b8e78

For Windows Vista / XP SP2 and SP3
The download file is named:  "QuickTimeInstaller.exe"
Its SHA-1 digest is:  5900ff0b8044972cb06b52dfc913c6364bf27ccc

QuickTime with iTunes for Windows XP or Vista The download file is named:  iTunes8Setup.exe Its SHA-1 digest is:  5d4ff8ffbe9feeaed67deb317797c1d71a03c359

Information will also be posted to the Apple Security Updates web site:  http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1222"

ALERT: malvertizements featuring Travelwise are being distributed ...

image

The sample I saw hit aboutstat.com (aboutstat.com/crossdomain.xml, and aboutstat.com/c/index.php?id=<<removed>>)

Registrar: Communigal Communications Ltd
Created 1 February 2008
Updated 8 September 2008

NS: ns1.aboutstat.com; ns2.aboutstat.com

IP: 92.61.100.3 (Estonia, Starline Web Services)

Registrant:  Serg Moon (moon.serg@gmail.com)  <--- a well known "bad actor"

Websites in IP range 92.61.100.% <-- many "bad actors"

1.  Createyourlove.net
2.  Findyourlovesite.com
3.  Finebeautifulwomen.net
4.  Girlslovefamily.net
5.  Inspiredlove.net
6.  Kindbeautifulgirls.net
7.  Makefamily.net
8.  Tenderwoman.net
9.  Happylovewithgirls.com
10.  Romanticnightworld.com
11.  Vaskot.com
12.  Advancedprivacyguard.com
13.  Advancedprivacyguard2008.com
14.  Advancedprivacyguardpro.com
15.  Advancedprivacyguardsolution.com
16.  Advancedprivacyguardtool.com
17.  Advancedprivacysuite.com
18.  Advancedprivacysuite2008.com
19.  Advancedprivacysuite2009.com
20.  Advancedprivacysuitepro.com
21.  Antispyexpert.com
22.  Antispyexpertpro.com
23.  Antispywareexpert-scanner.com
24.  Antispywareexpert-solution.com
25.  Antispywareexpert-system.com
26.  Antispywareexpert.com
27.  Antispywareexpertpro.com
28.  Bestpcprivacycleaner.com
29.  Cyberadvancedprivacysuite.com
30.  Globaladvancedprivacyguard.com
31.  Globaladvancedprivacysuite.com
32.  Pc-cleanerpro.com
33.  Pcadvancedprivacyguard.com
34.  Pcadvancedprivacysuite.com
35.  Pcprivacycleaner.com
36.  Pcprivacycleanerpro.com
37.  Personalpccleaner.com
38.  Swiftpcprivacycleaner.com
39.  Yourpcprivacycleaner.com

ALERT: treat any content from dentsu-inc.com with extreme caution

Reports have been received that there have been attempts to sell malvertizements, with contact being made by email, with the correspondent using the email address @dentsu-inc.com.

Dentsu is a large Japanese agency, but their real domain is @dentsu.com (no inc).

dentsu-inc.com was registered, not surprisingly, by the infamous Estdomains Inc.  The domain was created on 24 June 2008.

 

Danger signs:

1. The person selling the advertisement resisted requests to talk on the telephone.

2. Dentsu may be a very well known agency, but dentsu-inc.com is *not* the URL that the legitimate company uses.

3. Estdomains Inc is the registration service that was used for dentsu-inc.com.

4. The domain is only a few months old.

5. Estboxes.com supplies the nameservers:

Query for dentsu-inc.com type=255 class=1
  dentsu-inc.com NS (Nameserver) managedns1.estboxes.com
  dentsu-inc.com NS (Nameserver) managedns2.estboxes.com
  dentsu-inc.com NS (Nameserver) managedns3.estboxes.com
  dentsu-inc.com NS (Nameserver) managedns4.estboxes.com
  managedns2.estboxes.com A (Address) 69.50.183.26
  managedns3.estboxes.com A (Address) 69.50.182.22
  managedns4.estboxes.com A (Address) 69.50.183.30
  managedns1.estboxes.com A (Address) 69.50.182.20

This does not match with the services used by the legitimate dentsu.com web site:

Query for dentsu.com type=255 class=1
  dentsu.com NS (Nameserver) gatekeeper.isid-us.com
  dentsu.com NS (Nameserver) gatekeeper2.isid-us.com
  dentsu.com NS (Nameserver) ns.dentsu.com
  dentsu.com NS (Nameserver) ns1.dentsu.co.jp
  gatekeeper2.isid-us.com A (Address) 69.60.2.178
  ns.dentsu.com A (Address) 69.60.2.179
  gatekeeper.isid-us.com A (Address) 69.60.2.177

6. The IP address for the server hosting dentsu-inc.com is 85.255.122.4 (which is owned by the UkrTeleGroup in the Ukraine).  The URL itself automatically redirects to the legitimate Dentsu site, so if you don't look at what is going on behind the scenes, all you will see is a commonly experienced redirect.  It is *what/who* is redirecting you that is important in this case, not your end destination.

09/09/08 08:36:58 Browsing http://dentsu-inc.com/
Fetching http://dentsu-inc.com/ ...
GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: dentsu-inc.com

Connection: close

User-Agent: ****

HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily

Connection: close

Proxy-Connection: close

Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2008 00:37:01 GMT

Location: http://dentsu.com

Server: Directi Server 1.1

7. There are 1,196 other sites hosted on the same server as dentsu-inc.com, a very unusual situation for a company as large as Dentsu.  You would expect such a well known, large, corporation to use dedicated hosting.

Let's take a closer look at some IE8 features and option changes...

 

InPrivate browsing

One of the new IE8 features that is garnering a lot of interest is InPrivate.  Even before IE8 Beta 2 was released to the public, there was much speculation about the possibility of a new "porn mode" making its debut (thanks, in some part, to some sharp eyed people spotting that Microsoft had lodged a couple of new patents).

An InPrivate browsing session is started via the Safety Button image, or by using the keystroke combination of Ctrl/Shift/P.

 

icoTip Ctrl/Shift/P is the default keystroke combination used by the popular SnagIt program to trigger captures.  If SnagIt is running, and you are using the default key combination to trigger a capture, then you will only be able to start an InPrivate IE setting using the Safety button.

icoTip You can create a program shortcut that will open Internet Explorer in InPrivate mode by adding "-private" to the program's target path, eg on an x64 Vista system the path would be:

          "C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe" -private

 

When you surf using InPrivate mode, any cookies are automatically set as "session cookies" (and deleted when the InPrivate window is closed).  No History is saved, and any temporary internet files are also deleted when you close the browser window.  Autocomplete data such as form data and passwords are not saved, nor are typed addresses or search terms. 

If you open the History Pane when surfing using InPrivate mode, and select the setting "View By Order Visited Today", you will see that no entries are being added to your History as you go from page to page.  Any pages that you have already visited during a "normal" browsing mode can still be seen in the History pane.

It is important to note that the InPrivate session can read *existing* cookies, and that those existing cookies are not deleted once you close the InPrivate session.  You can also access pre-existing history when using InPrivate mode - it is new data that is created during an InPrivate session that is protected by InPrivate Browsing.

 

InPrivate browsing includes two features in addition to the automatic deletion of local data - InPrivate Blocking, and InPrivate Subscriptions.

InPrivate Blocking stops web sites from potentially gathering data about your web movements via javascript, tracking gifs and whatnot.  The IE team blog uses the example of a tracking javascript to explain how InPrivate Blocking works.  Blocking is not triggered until a particular javascript, tracking gif or whatnot is detected on at least 10 web sites.

InPrivate Subscriptions are XML (commonly known as RSS) feeds that contain a list of sites to block and allow.  It allows you to use "Manually block" without having to make a site by site decision about what status to assign each site.

 

InPrivate's impact on advertising

Some people have expressed concerns that InPrivate might block advertising - concerns that are proving to be justified.  The first domains to be blocked on my primary work machine were Google AdSense and Google Analytics.    Quantserv.com was the third site to be blocked.  The fourth site was 2mdn.net (owned by Doubleclick).

 image

 

Let's take a closer look at the way that InPrivate works.  We have three choices - Automatic, Manual and Off.

 

Automatically block
InPrivate will automatically block a data sharing URL once it has been detected on 10 or more sites.

Manually block
You choose which URLs are allowed to share data, and which are not - a data-sharing URL will not appear in the list until it has been detected on 10 or more sites.

icoTip If you use the "Automatically block" option, all sites that you see listed in the "Manually block" list will be blocked from sharing details even if you have set the website as "allowed" via the "Manually block" option.  For example, see the screenshot below - you can see that I have set two sites as Allow in the Manually block list, but these sites will still be blocked when I use the "Automatically block" setting.  Setting a site to "Allow" via "Manually block" will not over-ride blocking when using the "Automatically block" setting.

I admit that it worries me that advertising is being impacted by InPrivate Blocking.  I have always said that every (wo)man deserves their wage, and it worries me that web sites risk losing what may be, for them, an important income stream.  I also worry that web sites may stop using popular services like Google AdSense text adverts and move to a more risky advertising model.  For example, I chose the Google text ads and Microsoft Affiliates advertising campaigns because I know that visitors to my web sites will not have their web browsers hijacked by a malvertizement and dumped at a fraudware site.  I could not be sure that visitors to my sites would always be safe from such activity if I used dynamic advertising such as banner advertisements or pop-ups.  BTW, even Google's infrastructure has been used to display malvertizements, which is just one more reason to stick to text advertisements (here is the original report, and the follow-up report).    

The big players in the online advertising world will not be very happy if InPrivate Blocking begins to have a noticeable effect on their businesses, especially if other advertising services are not being impacted as quickly.  For example, InPrivate Blocking is blocking the Google advertisements on my web site, but it is not blocking the Microsoft advertisements:

 image      image

                                IE-VISTA IN IE8                                             IE-VISTA IN IE8 (INPRIVATE MODE)

 

A special note for the conspiracy theorists amongst us:

I must stress here that there is nothing nefarious in the fact that Google is being impacted upon by InPrivate Blocking while the Microsoft advertisement is not - I have no reason to believe, or suspect, that there is a secret plot to give Microsoft advertising preferential treatment, or to exclude Microsoft domains from InPrivate Blocking.  The reality is that Microsoft advertising campaigns like the ones on my sites are simply not as widespread as Google advertising, so you can put your tinfoil hats away now.

 

New option - show the Stop and Refresh Buttons before the Address Bar


image 

Personally, I don't like having the Stop and Refresh buttons to the left of the Address Bar, but to each his own :o)   Right click on Command Bar and turn on the relevant option... (note that the Links Bar is gone, replaced by a Favorites Bar.

image

 


Compatibility button

image  

I see that Opera, or more precisely, Opera's CTO, is complaining about the new Compatibility button, and the fact that *Intranet* sites are, by default, displayed in Compatibility View.  Hakon Lie doesn't like the fact that the graphic on the Compatibility button looks like a broken page (or, as some users I speak to describe it, a torn piece of paper), but let's look at this from the end user's perspective, shall we?  I've been watching people use IE8 Beta 2 over the past few days, and the only time that they pay any attention to the Compatibility button is... wait for it... when a web page doesn't display properly (that is, when it is "broken").  They then click on the "broken web page button" and voila, the web page displays correctly.   If it happens to appear for a page that displays ok, then they invariably don't notice that it has appeared.

To be honest, Hakon's suggestion to use the Acid Test Smiley Face simply does not make sense when you think of things from the perspective of the end user - after all, the average user is not going to think that a "broken" web page warrants a smiley face - if anything they would expect to see a frown - and you can bet that, more often than not, they will have no idea what the Acid Test is!

 

Why does IE8 "break the Web"?

The original plan was for Standards Mode to be "opt in" for IE8, a plan that coincided well with Chris Wilson's oft-stated desire to "not break the Web", but then a vocal developer community complained, and complained, and complained, about the decision until the IE team deferred to their desires and made Standards mode "opt out" (effectively breaking many pre-existing web pages).  Back when the decision was announced I wrote:

"Thinking back to when IE7 was in beta, I remember all of the pain that the changes to IE7 caused for web surfers etc, when we saw things like this:

and this

My primary concern now is how the Mums and Dads out there are going to react to these changes.  They are not developers. They do not understand page rendering, and CSS, and the developers' desire for "standards compliance".  All they know is that the web site that they are viewing is broken and they will not understand why."

Source: http://msmvps.com/blogs/spywaresucks/archive/2008/03/05/1533456.aspx

Microsoft is trying to make it easier for the end user to cope with the who-knows-how-many web pages around the world that will not display properly in Standards Mode.   It would be, dare I say it, a death knell for IE if end users are not given an easy way to view broken web pages that they encounter.  The end user needs to know that they do not have a faulty installation of Internet Explorer and that they need not waste time trying to "fix" things by uninstalling and reinstalling, and whatnot.  If MS does not show the end user that their installation of IE is not broken per se, then the end user just might uninstall IE8 because they think that it doesn't work, and that is NOT something that I want to see... in the end I don't give a damn about the IE versus Firefox versus Opera fisticuffs, or who has the highest user count, or who is winning or losing the browser war - what I *do* care about is the safety of end users - safety that could be compromised by not having the latest version of Microsoft's web browser installed.

 

Delete Browsing History

Note the new options to delete "InPrivate Blocking data" and "Preserve favorite website data".

image

 

Tabbed browsing settings

Note the options available for new tabs, and the option to enable Tab Groups. 

image

What are tab groups? These are tab groups - note the different colors.

Tab group controls:

Accessed by right clicking on any tab:

Close This Tab Group: will close the tab that is currently open, and all others of the same color.

Ungroup This Tab: ungroups the tab and changes it to the default color.

Duplicate Tab:  opens a new tab at the same URL.

image

Browsing History

 image

 

Manage Add-Ons

This is much improved - note that you will be able to manage your "InPrivate Blocking List" and "InPrivate Subscriptions", as well as Accelerators, Search Providers and Toolbars/Extensions (as you can see, I work with a lot of different search engines).  Also, note that you can "Prevent programs from suggesting changes to [your] default search provider".

image

 

Security Settings

A new ActiveX Security Setting - ActiveX changes are explained in detail here:
http://blogs.msdn.com/ie/archive/2008/05/07/ie8-security-part-ii-activex-improvements.aspx

 

image 

 

Phishing Filter is now SmartScreen

More info about SmartScreen here:
http://blogs.msdn.com/ie/archive/2008/07/02/ie8-security-part-iii-smartscreen-filter.aspx

 

image

 

New XSS filter enabled by default (XSS = "cross site scripting") - more info here:
http://blogs.msdn.com/ie/archive/2008/07/02/ie8-security-part-iv-the-xss-filter.aspx

 

image

 

Disable InPrivate Blocking data
image

 

New Feed and WebSlice settings

image

 

Advanced Settings

New option: Enable Caret Browsing for new windows and tabs

image

Note: "Enable personalized favorites" menu option is gone.

New options: Display Accelerator button on selection, Enable automatic crash recovery, Enable Suggested Sites.

Note the blue Accelerator button...

image   image

 

Inline Auto Complete - stipulates "outside of Internet Explorer"

image

 

New options: "Enable DOM Storage" and "Enable SmartScreen filter".

image

Posted by sandi with 1 comment(s)
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ALERT: Malvertizement featuring car.com

This one uses some pretty old protocols, but is still in cirulation:

getfreecar.com/statsa.php?u=<<removed>>

getfreecar.com/statsg.php?u=<<removed>> (loads the long since discarded gnida.swf)

getfreecar.com/statss.php?campaign=<<removed>>

blessedads.com/?cmpid=<<removed>>

adnetserver.com/?tmn=<<removed>>

antispywaremaster.com/<<removed>>

image

image

image

Updated VPC images have been released...

Download here - the images will expire in January 2009

http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=21EABB90-958F-4B64-B5F1-73D0A413C8EF&displaylang=en

Images available:

Windows XP SP3 with IE6
Windows XP SP2 with IE7
Windows XP SP3 with IE8 Beta 2
Vista with IE7

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