April 2004 - Posts
I was glad to see this discussed, even though there were few actual solutions reached.
FTC Adware/Spyware Conference - few solutions popup
http://news.com.com/2100%2D1028%2D5195222.html
Quote: Spyware, adware and other code that lurks on hard drives has become so pervasive it's bedeviling home users, driving corporate technology managers to distraction and has become the top complaint in customer service calls to computer makers.
Quote: Spyware and adware problems became the largest single customer service complaint late last year, Dell attorney Maureen Cushman told the FTC workshop. It's become "a huge technical support issue for us," Cushman said, resulting in "slow performance, inability to access the Internet, extra icons and pop-up ads. This damages our brand and, most importantly, impairs the customer experience."
MORE INFORMATION ON THE FTC WORKSHOP
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/index.htm
Microsoft did a quality job overall given the magnitude of the 20 bundled security changes in the April 2004 updates. Below are some 3 minor issues reported so far in our 11,000 member My IT Forums. Hopefully, the good quality and regression testing exterted by Microsoft will continue to hold up.
# 1 - ROAMING PROFILES & MAPPED DRIVE ISSUES
First issue encountered with MS04-011 - This from my colleague and administrator of our Citrix farm... We've discovered that the -011 patch messes up roaming profiles and homedrive homepath mappings – Supposedly MS has quite few cases on this. I don’t think you use roaming profiles but hope there is nothing else mucked up – wanted to give you an FYI
# 2 - WINDOWS NT 4 - NTOSKRNL.EXE ISSUES
I've seen this on servers that were originally Uniprocessor HALs that were converted to Multiprocessor HALS later. When the patch runs, it replaces ntoskrnl.exe with the wrong HAL version. I have seen an issue on some of my NT 4.0 Workstation PC's. I get a missing NTOSKRNL.EXE on reboot. To fix it I had to restore the NTOSKRNL.EXE from C:\WINNT\$KB835732$ Anyone else seen this?
# 3 - WINDOWS 2003 IE 6 ISSUE (after updates) - Cipher Strength = 0
NTBugtraq Mailing List
This is a functionality regression that has been around for some time. The weird part of the MS04-011 patch is that it only occurs on Windows 2003.
KB261328: Cipher Strength Appears as 0-Bit in Internet Explorer
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=261328
SYMPTOMS - In Microsoft Internet Explorer, you may experience the following behaviors: When you click About Internet Explorer on the Help menu, the Cipher Strength value is 0-bit. -and- You cannot connect to and view Web pages on secure Web sites.
CAUSE - This behavior can occur if the Schannel.dll, Rsabase.dll, or Rsaenh.dll files are missing, damaged, or of the incorrect version.
-----Original Message-----
Subject: [Full-Disclosure] MS04-011 Break SSL support in IE 6.0.3790.0 with Windows 2003
Hello everyone, A warning to all Windows 2003 user, this happened on two machine who had the exact same software configuration but different hardware. After installing the latest set of patches from microsoft, I was unable to access sites using SSL, after some investigation it turned out that my IE Cipher strength was set to 0 bit ... After lot of troubleshooting and tryout with the different solutions offered by Microsoft I decided to take a guess and uninstall the MS04-011 patch... Well, the problem solved itself, the IE Cipher Strength is now at 128 like it was before, I can now access sites using SSL, windowsupdate, msn, etc ... Weird ..
I believe Spyware/Adware prevention is the next frontier in security where more work needs to be done by the AV vendors. Personally, I like using SpyBot and AdAware for monthly checks, even though I rarely have any issues. Staying on mainstream sites and using complementary browsers like Firefox or Opera for less trusted sites can help mitigate this risk somewhat.
Article: PCs are full of Spyware/Adware
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3633167.stm
The average computer is packed with hidden software that can secretly spy on online habits, a study has found. The US net provider EarthLink said it uncovered an average of 28 spyware programs on each PC scanned during the first three months of the year.
Netsky.W Links
http://www.sarc.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.netsky.w@mm.html
http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_104470.htm
http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB20040416S0007
http://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/netsky_w.shtml
http://www.pandasoftware.com/virus_info/encyclopedia/overview.aspx?idvirus=46390
NetSky.W worm variant was discovered on April 16th, 2004. This variant is very closely related to the "N" and "P" variants. It is a mass-mailing worm that uses its own SMTP engine to send itself to the email addresses it finds when scanning the hard drives and mapped drives.
The "sender" of the email is spoofed, and its subject, message body, and attachment vary. The attachment has .exe, .pif, .scr or .zip as extension types.
It deletes the entries belonging to several worms, including Mydoom.A, Mydoom.B, Mimail.T and several variants of Bagle (so the virus wars continue). The bad news is that this will continue to escalate new variants among all these families.
This new Gaobot variant is trying harder than any worm I've seen so far to get into your corporate network.
This Blaster-like Internet worm attempts to find weak passwords, IRC vulnerabilities, Beagle/MyDoom backdoors and finally SEVEN different Microsoft security exploits. Thankfully, these are older security holes that should be patched up for corporate users.
Still SEVEN different exploits might be a record for the Blaster like series
W32.Gaobot.AAY Information:
http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.gaobot.aay.html
W32.Gaobot.AAY is a minor variant of W32.Gaobot.SY. This worm attempts to spread through network shares with weak passwords. It also allows attackers to access an infected computer using a predetermined IRC channel.
The worm uses multiple vulnerabilities to spread, including:
This bulletin from the Internet Storm Center advises everyone to get patched quickly. Some of the patches have been reverse engineered into exploits and there is the potential for "Blaster-like" worms to emerge.
MS04-011 EXPLOITS Published - Internet Storm Center
Exploits Available For MS04-11 Vulnerbilities – **PATCH NOW**
Dave Aitel of Immunity Security has stated publicly that they have released working exploits of two vulnerabilities patched by MS04-011 to their CANVAS customers:
http://lists.immunitysec.com/pipermail/dailydave/2004-April/000500.html
The LSASS.EXE vulnerability can be exploited to run arbitrary code with “system” privileges on vulnerable servers. eEye Digital Security has more details and also confirms the ability to run arbitrary code with “system” privileges using this vulnerability:
http://www.eeye.com/html/Research/Advisories/AD20040413C.html
Immunity’s claim that they have a working ASN.1 exploit has not been directly confirmed, but we have several anonymous confirmations that working exploits exist.
IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE PATCHES PROVIDED BY MICROSOFT IN ITS APRIL SECURITY RELEASE BE APPLIED TO SYSTEMS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. It is our belief that the likelihood of a worm being released SOON that exploits one of the vulnerabilities addressed by these patches is VERY HIGH.
Netsky.V is a new variant that uses HTML scripting and unpatched MS exploits to spread rather than email attachments.
NETSKY.V Links and Information
http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_101175.htm
http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.netsky.v@mm.html
http://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/virusencyclo/default5.asp?VName=WORM_NETSKY.V
This variant of W32/Netsky is similar to previous variants of W32/Netsky, however the virus does not spread as an email attachment, but rather as a hyperlink pointing to an infected system. It bears the following characteristics:
- infects by spreading exploit script, which automatically downloads and executes the virus from a remote infected system constructs messages using its own SMTP engine
- harvests email addresses from the victim machine
- spoofs the To: and From: address of messages
- opens a port on the victim machine (TCP 5556 & 5557)
- delivers a DoS attack on certain web sites upon a specific date condition
EMAIL TO AVOID OR BLOCK (this does not use attachments)
From: (spoofed email address)
To: (spoofed email address)
Subject: (any of the following)
- Gateway Status Failure
- Mail delivery failed
- Mail Delivery Sytem failure
- Server Status failure
Message body: (any of the following)
- Converting message. Please wait....
- Please wait while converting the message...
- Please wait while loading failed message...
- The processing of this message can take a few minutes...
MICROSOFT SECURITY BULLETINS - THAT HELP TO PREVENT INFECTION
Netsky.V relies on several unpatched vulnerablies as noted below:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS99-032.mspx
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-032.mspx
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-040.mspx
HOW NETSKY.V INFECTS UNPATCHED SYSTEMS
http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/graphics/w32.netsky.v@mm.1.gif
Step 1. W32.Netsky.V@mm constructs the message body using the Microsoft Internet Explorer XML Page Object Type Validation Vulnerability (CAN-2003-0809 / Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-040). Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a malicious object to be trusted and as such be installed and executed on the local system. The composed email body contains the object that points to the following source:
data=http://%INFECTED_COMPUTER_IP%:5557/index.html
Step 2. As a result, the victim computer will query the index.html page from the HTTP server, that is installed on the infected computer and listens on port 5557.
Step 3. Once the HTTP server accepts incoming connection, it will forge an HTML-page that exploits the Microsoft IE5 ActiveX "Object for constructing type libraries for scriptlets" Vulnerability (CVE-1999-0668 / Microsoft Security Bulletin MS99-032).
Step 4. The code contained in the viral index.html file will run the ftp.exe to connect to the FTP server, listening on port 5556 on the infected computer, and query the worm executable.
Step 5. The worm executable will be retrieved and executed locally.
This announcement in eEye's newsletter, highlights the importance of the critical the April security bulletins. So far, this has worked well for W/98 and XP with zero issues so far. I'm planning to plug in my W/2000 SP4 system to update it today also.
eEye Digital Security Uncovers Dangerous Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows
Six new vulnerabilities related to Microsoft Windows were announced today. The discoveries include critical flaws in Windows Remote Procedure Call (RPC), Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), and in the rendering of Windows Metafile (WMF) and Enhanced Metafile (EMF) image formats. Of the six newly discovered, four are extremely critical since they allow for the remote execution of code on unpatched machines.
Systems Affected
Affected systems include all current versions of Microsoft Windows and Windows Server 2003.
Potential Impact
These vulnerabilities could potentially allow an attacker to take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then take any action on the affected system, including installing programs; viewing, changing, or deleting data; or creating new accounts with full privileges. eEye and Microsoft have released detailed advisories to alert Windows users of the need to immediately secure vulnerable machines on their networks.
Severity Rating and Vulnerability Identifiers*:
|
Vulnerability Identifiers |
Impact Of Vulnerability |
Windows NT Server 4.0 |
Windows 2000 |
Windows XP |
Windows Server 2003 |
|
RPC Runtime Library Vulnerability |
Remote Code Execution |
None
|
Cr itical |
Critical |
Critical |
|
LSASS Vulnerability |
Remote Code Execution |
None |
Critical |
Critical |
Low |
|
Metafile Vulnerability |
Remote Code Execution |
Critical |
Critical |
Critical |
None |
|
Local Descriptor Table Vulnerability |
Privilege Elevation |
Important |
Important |
None |
None |
|
Virtual DOS Machine Vulnerability |
Privilege Elevation |
Important |
Important |
None |
None |
|
RPCSS Service Vulnerability |
Denial Of Service |
None |
Important |
Important |
Important |
*The above assessment is based on the types of systems that are affected by the vulnerability, typical deployment patterns, and the effect that exploiting the vulnerability would have on them.(source: Microsoft)
Protecting Against These Vulnerabilities
The most effective way to protect vulnerable systems is to apply the hotfixes released by Microsoft. The hotfixes will remediate these vulnerabilities, and can be found here:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS04-011.mspx
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS04-012.mspx
Retina Network Security Scanner
Retina has been updated to check for all of the above vulnerabilities. These checks are included in Retina versions 4.9.194 and higher. Retina is the only scanner that is 100% non-intrusive and can scan remotely without administrative access. For a comprehensive list of Retina audits click here:
http://www.eeye.com/html/mkt/gen/AprilAdv.html
Additional Information: eEye Security Bulletins
Microsoft DCOM RPC Memory Leak
http://www.eeye.com/html/Research/Advisories/AD20040413A.html
Microsoft DCOM RPC Race Condition
http://www.eeye.com/html/Research/Advisories/AD20040413B.html
Windows Local Security Authority Service Remote Buffer Overflow
http://www.eeye.com/html/Research/Advisories/AD20040413C.html
Windows Expand-Down Data Segment Local Privilege Escalation
http://www.eeye.com/html/Research/Advisories/AD20040413D.html
Windows VDM TIB Local Privilege Escalation
http://www.eeye.com/h! tml/Rese arch/Advisories/AD20040413E.html
Windows Metafile Heap Overflow
http://www.eeye.com/html/Research/Advisories/AD20040413F.html
?>
1. Make sure passwords aren't found in a password dictionary commonly used by hackers and crackers. Alphanumeric passwords are a good starting point if complex passwords with mixed case or special characters are too difficult for users.
2. Audit passwords quarterly using a testing tool and follow-up privately with all users with weak passwords to educate them.
3. Change user passwords every 60 to 120 days depending on security needs for your organization
4. Implement the account policy features for password resets, reuse, and other protective measures to ensure passwords are rotated in a controlled fashion.
5. Change ALL service account and special Administor passwords at least annually.
6. Have solid standards in place for the Help Desk, so they don't accidently leak out a password (use a PIN system for employee resets). Then in Network Penetration testing call from outside phones to ensure they are following the best practices (e.g., putting service above security needs).
7. Move to AD security and Kerboros for more secure Unicode based password formats. This creates far more complex and secure passwords than the 14 byte approach used by older versions of NT.
8. Users must choose a different password for public Internet based web sites than they use for the corporate networks.
9. Create formal corporate policies to discourage disclosing passwords to others and having them in plain sight (if users need to write down passwords they need hide this - but hopefully they can develop an approach to remember them more easily). Never share passwords in an email message.
10. Develop a good security awareness program on the importance of passwords and how users can help safeguard corporate assets by following the best practices. Remember that a single passwords is often the only barrier preventing an Internet based system from being compromised.
11. Anytime you implement a new software product or technology, make sure all DEFAULT passwords are changed. This is one of the top methods hackers or crackers can compromise corporate security.
12. When employees leave a company, disable their old passwords immediately. If they were previously security or network administrators, change all applicable administrator and service level accounts.
13. Anytime your corporate site is hacked or cracked by unauthorized users, immediately change all effected passwords.
14. For high security needs in a business solution, don't rely on passwords alone, but look at two-factor authentication (smart cards, secure-id, biometrics, etc). Always plan and design security into any new business solution as part of the project planning process.
15.The longer password or pass-phrase is in length, the takes longer to crack. It's also important to strive for an easy-to-remember password. Spend a little time in composing an alphanumeric password that you can easily remember and that is 8 characters or more in length.
The following Microsoft vulnerabilities were announced on April 13, 2004. I highly recommend using Windows Update to apply these as soon as possible.
Three of the four bulletins have been rated as critical
MS04-011 - Security Update for Microsoft Windows (835732)
Rated by Microsoft as: CRITICAL
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms04-011.mspx
MS04-012 - Cumulative Update for Microsoft RPC/DCOM (828741)
Rated by Microsoft as: CRITICAL
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms04-012.mspx
MS04-013 - Cumulative Security Update for Outlook Express (837009) Rated by Microsoft as: CRITICAL
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms04-013.mspx
MS04-014 - Vulnerability in the Microsoft Jet Database Engine Could Allow Code Execution (837001)
Rated by Microsoft as: IMPORTANT
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms04-014.mspx
I thoroughly enjoyed my first MVP Summit meeting and published a few photos on my web site. This conference provided great educational sessions and opporunties to share improvements with Microsoft.
I want to thank Jerry, Sanjay, and Susan who had major parts in planning the security sessions and social events. I appreciate Microsoft's assistance with some of our expenses, as many of us must work within tight budgetary constraints.
This conference is one of the highlights of my professional career. I had the opportunity to update my security knowledge and meet new friends.
Microsoft MVP Summit 2004 - Security Agenda
|
April 5, 2004 |
Security Topics |
Speakers |
|
9 AM – 12:00 |
Intro to MSRC & PSS Sec teams |
Iain Mulholland & team, Mark Miller & team, Jerry Bryant, Sanjay Puri |
|
12:00 -– 1:00 PM |
Lunch |
|
|
1:00 PM – 2:00 PM |
Conducting network vulnerability assessments |
Jesper Johansson |
|
2:00 PM – 2:15 PM |
Break |
|
|
2:15 PM – 3:15 PM |
Root Kits |
Lee Yan |
|
3:15 PM - 3:30 PM |
Break |
|
|
3:30 PM – 4:30 PM |
Windows XP SP2 |
Todd Wanke |
|
4:45 PM – 5:45 PM |
Locking down your Win2k/Win2k3 server |
Ben Smith |
|
6:30 PM – 9:30 PM |
Dinner hosted by SBTU |
|
|
|
|
|
|
April 7, 2004 |
Security Topics |
Speakers |
|
9 AM – 10 AM |
Microsoft’s strategy for Security |
Jeff Jones |
|
10 AM – 10:45 AM |
Security Update Validation Program |
Lynn Terwoerds |
|
10:45 AM – 11 AM |
Break |
|
|
11:00 AM – 12 |
Patch Management |
Steve Anderson |
|
12 AM – 1 PM |
Lunch |
|
|
1 PM – 2 PM |
Security at Microsoft |
Greg Wood |
|
2:00 PM – 3:00 PM |
Wireless Security |
Drew Baron |
|
3:15 PM – 4 PM |
Closing remarks and thanks |
Sanjay Puri & Jerry Bryant |
?>
?>
?>